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Abstract. This study presents the results from a comprehensive out-of-sample test of long-run re-
turns following mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using a unique sample from 23 frontier markets 
of almost 800 transactions conducted during the years 1992 to 2016, we implement both cross-
sectional tests and time-series examinations based on a calendar-time portfolio approach. Contrary 
to evidence from developed markets, the M&As in these frontier markets do not lead to abnormal 
underperformance of acquirers, regardless of whether they paid for the acquisition with cash or 
stock. The results are robust to many considerations, including subsample and subperiod analysis, 
alternative formation periods, different portfolio construction approaches.
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Introduction
In 1998, German-based Daimler-Benz AG and U.S.-based Chrysler Corporation, two leading 
global car manufacturers, decided to combine their businesses in what was perceived to be a 
merger of equals (Casestudyinc 2008). Daimler paid 37 billion USD in a stock swap exchange 
and on November 17, 1998, DaimlerChrysler’s joint chiefs launched global trading in the 
shares of the new company which, with a market capitalization of 100 billion USD, was the 
world’s fifth-largest car maker. When ringing the Wall Street bell, the two company chiefs, 
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Robert Eaton and Juergen Schrempp, presented a vision of becoming the world’s third-largest 
car maker within only three years. The opening ceremony was broadcast on DaimlerChrys-
ler’s business TV channel to all of the 260 DaimlerChrysler plants in 25 countries so that 
each of the more than 400,000 workers could celebrate this special moment (Gallagher 1998). 
The troubles were yet to come.
This transaction was overwhelmingly endorsed by analysts optimistic about its prospects 
of success (Gallagher 1998). DaimlerChrysler was supposed to benefit not only from cost sav-
ings, but also from complementary product lines. Unfortunately, contrasting organizational 
cultures and management styles effectively hindered execution of the planned synergies. 
As a result, only three years after the merger, the DaimlerChrysler market cap was equal to 
Daimler’s stand-alone market cap just before the transaction. Finally, in May 2007, Daim-
lerChrysler decided to dump the money-losing Chrysler unit, announcing the disposal of an 
80 percent stake to a private equity firm (Isidore 2007). Eventually, DaimlerChrysler received 
only 1.4 billion USD for the Chrysler unit – an amount that was not even enough to cover 
the losses generated by the unit before the sale.
Interestingly, the Harvard Business Review in its June 2016 edition published a report 
claiming that, typically, between 70 and 90 percent of acquisitions end up as abysmal failures 
(Martin 2016). In this regard, the Daimler and Chrysler deal seems to have been unexcep-
tional.
The objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive out-of-sample test of alleged 
long-run value destruction following mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in equity markets. 
The question of whether M&A processes increase or destroy value for shareholders of the 
acquiring companies has greatly interested academics and market practitioners. Surprisingly, 
the early studies of developed markets indicated that M&A deals lead to remarkable destruc-
tion of value in the acquirers, resulting in long-term negative post-merger abnormal returns 
of approximately 10% per annum that persist up to five years (Limmack 1991; Agrawal et al. 
1992; Loughran, Vijh 1997; Moelleer et al. 2005).
Our paper aims to contribute by performing a comprehensive out-of-sample examination 
of long-run post-merger performance. To this end, we examine the performance of acquirers 
from frontier markets for the years 1997 through 2016. We cover a broad range of almost 800 
acquisitions conducted in 23 frontier markets from South America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern 
Europe. Therefore, our research can be described as out-of-sample both geographically and 
temporally, as the previous studies concentrated predominantly on a handful of developed 
markets: the United States, UK, and Canada. As far as we are aware, there is no study avail-
able that covered frontier markets. Second, our sample period starts after the sample pe-
riod end points of crucial earlier studies, including Limmack (1991), Franks et al. (1991), 
Agrawal et al. (1992), Loughram and Vijh (1997), Mitchel and Stafford (2000), and Dube 
and Glascock (2006).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the theoretical basis for 
this research. Section 2 presents our data sources and sample preparation. Section 3 discusses 
the research methods, and section 4 presents the results. The last section presents conclud-
ing remarks.
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1. Theoretical basis and hypothesis development
There is rich empirical evidence indicating that mergers, on average, do not create any value 
for the acquiring firms and, indeed, often destroy value. Analysis of share price reaction on 
major stock markets in the period around takeover announcements show that target com-
pany shareholders typically experience large gains in wealth, but acquiring company share-
holders do not (Jensen, Ruback, 1983; Andrade et al. 2001; Moeller et al. 2005).
However, the results are also sensitive to the method of payment. Interestingly, positive 
abnormal stock returns are found after cash tender offers. Bouwman et al. (2009) document 
that cash acquirers outperformed in the 1980s, but underperformed in later years. Also, 
Friedman (2006) uses a large sample covering the period from 1962 until 2000 and docu-
ments the poor post-merger performance of stock bidders contrasted to outperformance 
following cash acquisitions.
Although the abnormal post-merger performance has been known for more than two 
decades, it still poses a puzzle to the academic community and a challenge for market prac-
titioners. As neoclassical theories predict that we should observe no systematic long-run 
underperformance following mergers (Mueller 1969), the potential explanations are usually 
provided by behavioral finance. The behavioral finance framework offers two general con-
cepts here. First, it is assumed that managers are fully rational and the source of M&A activity 
lies in the inefficient market that allows relative mispricing between the acquirer and target 
firms. Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), and Zaremba and 
Grobelny (2016) offer a misvaluation theory that implies that rational managers acting in the 
interest of long-term shareholders initiate acquisitions – especially paid with stock – to capi-
talize on temporary overvaluation of the acquirer’s equity. Thus, overvaluation at the time of 
the transaction may result in a future reversal and long-run negative abnormal returns. The 
second general behavioral concept points to managerial irrationality and biases, often com-
bined with agency problems. Examples include empire building by managers (Sudarsanam, 
Mahate 2006), managerial entrenchment (Shleifer, Vishny 1989), hubris and overconfidence 
(Roll 1986), and the managerial discretion hypothesis (Mueller 1969), to name just a few.
Besides these concepts, in this study we also suggest a new, simple explanation: we hy-
pothesize that the long-term post-acquisition abnormal performance is a spurious phenom-
enon. The recent asset pricing literature has documented a cornucopia of supposed return 
predictive signals in equity markets. Having reviewed only the top tier papers up to the year 
2013, Harvey et al. (2016) identified more than 300 such signals. Alas, most of them are likely 
to be false discoveries (Harvey 2017). Indeed, a few recent studies have indicated that return 
regularities tend to follow a sort of Murphy’s Law: once uncovered, they quickly disappear; 
their out-of-sample performance is more than disappointing (McLean, Pontiff 2016). The big 
quest ahead is to separate the “wheat” anomalies from the “chaff ” anomalies, and there is no 
better way to do this than by extensive replication and out-of-sample testing (Harvey 2017).
In fact, our hypothesis is consistent with a few recent papers that also cast doubt on 
the significance of the abnormal performance following M&A deals. For instance, Mitchel 
and Stafford (2000), Dube and Glascock (2006), and Dutta and Jog (2009) investigated the 
U.S. and Canadian markets and found no significant abnormal returns following such deals. 
Although these replications are not entirely out-of-sample – they all examined just a few 
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developed markets and the sample periods overlapped to some extent with the earlier stud-
ies – their results support our “spurious anomaly” hypothesis.
2. Data sources and sample preparation
Our broad equities sample encompasses 23 countries classified as frontier markets by MSCI 
and included in the MSCI Frontier Markets Index: Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Estonia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mo-
rocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Vietnam. 
We use accounting and price data from Bloomberg, including companies classified both as 
listed and delisted to minimize any potential survivorship bias. The sample period of returns 
runs from March 1997 to September 2016, but we also use earlier data when necessary for 
calculating certain variables, such as the book-to-market ratio.
We applied several static and dynamic filters. A company was included in the sample for a 
month t when its return in month t and its total capitalization at the end of month t–1 were 
both available. The sample was to contain only common stocks and only securities for which 
the selected frontier countries were the primary markets were included. We eliminated any 
company in month t when at the end of month t–1 either its nominal share price dropped 
under 0.20 USD, or the total stock market capitalization sank under 10 million USD. Finally, 
we screened the data for suspicious returns, deleting observations with monthly returns of 
more than 500% or less than –98% as these most likely came from miscalculated stock split 
ratios (10 observations in total). Using all eligible companies available in Bloomberg, the final 
sample consisted of 3,627 firms. The basic composition and the evolution of the sample are 
shown in Figure A1 and Table A1 in the Appendix A.1
All data were converted into USD. Also, to be consistent with the use of USD, we used 
the 1-month U.S. T-bill rate sourced from Kenneth R. French’s data library (French 2016) as 
a proxy for the risk-free rate.
The sample of mergers and acquisitions includes all the acquisitions revealed in Bloomberg 
that were conducted by firms from our equity universe within the period from September 1992 
to September 2016. We included only the acquisitions of public companies listed in the frontier 
markets that resulted in a change of control and only when both the ISIN number and the 
completion announcements date were available. In total, our sample encompassed 793 deals – 
345 of these were paid in cash, 98 were paid in stock, and, in the remaining cases, the type of 
financing was undisclosed in Bloomberg. Our sample of mergers is depicted in Figure 1.
3. Research methods
We start our investigations with simple monthly regressions in the style of Fama and Mac-
Beth (1973). The univariate regressions are based on the following formula:
 , 0 1 , : 1 ,i t i t k t i tR D − −= β +β + ε ,  (1)
1 The appendices are available upon request and at http://adamzaremba.pl/.
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where Ri,t is the return on factor i in month t, Di,t–k:t–1 is the dummy variable equal to unity if 
the company i conducted an acquisition within months t–k to t–1, and β0 and β1 are regres-
sion parameters. Following, for example, Moeller et al. (2005) and Andre et al. (2004), we 
use the completion date as the reference time for the acquisition. We calculate the variable 
, : 1i t k tD − − using various approaches: we base it on the full sample of M&As, as well as on 
the subsamples of acquisitions paid for with cash only or stocks only. Also, given that there 
is no consensus in the literature regarding how long the influence of acquisitions lasts, we 
consider a spectrum of different periods k used in earlier studies, ranging from 12 months, 
used by, e.g., Dube and Glascock, (2006) to 60 months, used by, e.g., Agrawal et al. (1992) 
and Loughran and Vijh (1997).
We continue with time-series tests based on calendar-time portfolios. The approach was 
implemented for post-merger performance by Savor and Lu (2009) and Bouwman et al. 
(2009), inter alia. For a few reasons, in studies of long-run events, the calendar-time portfolio 
approach has more recently been preferred to the buy-and-hold return approach (BHAR) 
that was previously popular. First, the calendar-time portfolio approach deals with the prob-
lems of instability of pricing model parameters. Second, as pointed out by Fama (1998), the 
BHAR approach assumes the derivation of long-term returns from the compounding of 
short-term returns, which may yield excessive abnormal returns even when there is no ab-
normal return after the first period. Third, BHAR assumes zero correlation among event-firm 
returns; meanwhile, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argued that M&As cluster through time, 
leading to the cross-correlation of abnormal returns. Finally, the calendar-time portfolio ap-
proach is aligned with an investor perspective.
To implement the calendar-time portfolio approach, at the end of each month t we form 
portfolios of firms that acquired other companies during the k previous months. For robust-
ness, we use three variants of k, which belong to the range of the most popular formation 
periods used in earlier studies: 36, 48, and 60 months.2 Also, we use two different weighting 
schemes: equal-weighting and capitalization-weighting.
We evaluate the performance of the calendar-time portfolios with the recent five-factor 
(FF5) model of Fama and French (2015):
 , , , , , , , ,i t i MKT i t SMB i t HML i t WML i t WML i t i tR MKT SMB HML RMW CMA= α +β +β +β +β +β + ε   
  (2)
where ,MKT iβ , ,SMB iβ , ,HML iβ , ,RMW iβ , ,CMA iβ , and iα  are the model’s estimated param-
eters; ,MKT iβ , ,SMB iβ , ,HML iβ , ,RMW iβ , and ,CMA iβ , are measures of exposure to MKTt 
(market risk), SMBt (small minus big), HMLt  (high minus low), RMWt  (robust minus weak), 
and CMAt  (conservative minus aggressive) risk factors, respectively, and iα  represents the 
average abnormal return. The five factors represent the returns of a market portfolio and the 
performance of widely-acknowledged size, value, profitability, and investment strategies. The 
detailed procedure for calculating the factor returns and their basic statistical properties are 
reported in Tables A2 and A3 of the Appendix A, respectively.
2 See, for example, Dutta and Jog (2009) for the review of the methodological choices.
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4. Empirical results
The results of the Fama-MacBeth analysis are depicted in Figure 1. Generally, in line with the 
implications of the misvaluation theory, the coefficients are predominantly negative for the 
companies that conducted acquisitions during the previous 18–60 months (Panel B); these 
are, however, very modest in terms of absolute values. The negative coefficients are much 
more pronounced for deals paid for with stock, amounting to approximately –0.35 for the 
standard 36–60-month formation period, as compared to less than half of this value for the 
deals paid for with cash. Nevertheless, as shown in Panel B, none of the coefficients differs 
significantly from zero. In other words, the Fama-MacBeth test provides no formal support of 
the  hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003); no significant underperformance is recorded.
Table 1 reports the monthly returns on companies that conducted acquisitions during the 
previous 36 (Panel A) and 60 (Panel B) months (results on the 48-month formation period 
are displayed in Table A4 of Appendix A). A quick eyeball check leads to the conclusion that 
the acquirers in frontier markets are not characterized by any significant underperformance, 
either in the raw approach or after adjusting for the factors of the FF5 (2015) model. In 
fact, in the case of long-only equal-weighted portfolios, the five-factor model alphas were 
Note. The figure displays coefficients (Panel A) and corresponding t-statistics (Panel B) for the 
univariate monthly regressions in the style of Fama and MacBeth (1973) based on the formula: 
, 0 1 , : 1 ,i t i t k t i tR D − −= β +β + ε , where Ri,t is the return on factor i in month t, Di,t–k:t–1 is the dummy 
variable equal to unity if the company i conducted an acquisition within months t–k to t–1, and β0 
and β1 are regression parameters. The figure also displays alternative definitions of Di,t–k:t–1 referring 
to acquisitions paid for with cash or stock only.
Figure 1. Results of the cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions
Panel A: Regression coefficients
Panel B: Corresponding t-statistics
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Table 1. Performance of calendar-time portfolios of acquirers
  Equal-weighted portfolios Value-weighted portfolios
Acquirers Others A-O Acquirers Others A-O
Panel A: 36-month formation period
R 0.35 0.37 –0.02 0.01 –0.12 0.13
(0.95) (1.45) (–0.07) (–0.02) (–0.50) (0.43)
Vol 5.50 3.68 3.92 6.43 4.56 4.88
α 0.45* 0.33* 0.12 0.23 –0.02 0.25
(2.14) (1.98) (0.59) (1.05) (–0.43) (0.99)
MKT 0.93** 0.67** 0.26** 1.01** 0.97** 0.04
(10.94) (8.53) (4.62) (13.68) (78.39) (0.46)
SMB –0.26* 0.18** –0.44** –0.50** 0.09** –0.59**
(–2.23) (2.81) (–5.24) (–4.11) (5.93) (–4.52)
HML 0.06 0.03 0.04 –0.02 0.03 –0.06
(0.64) (0.40) (0.50) (–0.32) (1.74) (–0.63)
RMW 0.01 0.08** –0.07 –0.12 0.05** –0.16*
(0.30) (2.87) (–1.29) (–1.75) (2.69) (–1.97)
CMA –0.06 –0.14** 0.07 –0.08 0.00 –0.07
(–1.03) (–4.31) (1.18) (–0.81) (–0.21) (–0.66)
R2 0.68 0.68 0.34 0.70 0.96 0.21
Panel B: 60-month formation period
R 0.39 0.37 0.02 0.00 –0.10 0.10
(1.06) (1.44) (0.09) (–0.02) (–0.42) (0.34)
Vol 5.48 3.68 3.91 6.52 4.52 5.02
α 0.51* 0.33 0.18 0.25 –0.01 0.27
(2.48) (1.94) (0.89) (1.07) (–0.20) (0.96)
MKT 0.93** 0.67** 0.27** 1.03** 0.96** 0.07
(11.32) (8.46) (4.41) (12.30) (59.71) (0.76)
SMB –0.27* 0.18** –0.45** –0.47** 0.09** –0.55**
(–2.20) (2.85) (–5.03) (–3.55) (4.60) (–3.75)
HML 0.06 0.03 0.03 –0.04 0.04 –0.08
(0.58) (0.42) (0.43) (–0.36) (1.88) (–0.67)
RMW 0.01 0.08** –0.07 –0.12 0.05* –0.17*
(0.23) (2.85) (–1.40) (–1.83) (2.40) (–1.96)
CMA –0.04 –0.14** 0.10 –0.02 –0.02 0.01
(–0.59) (–4.43) (1.45) (–0.16) (–1.12) (0.06)
R2 0.69 0.68 0.36 0.69 0.95 0.19
Note.  The table reports the performance of calendar-time portfolios formed of stocks of firms that 
conducted acquisitions (Acquirers) during the previous 36 (Panel A) and 60 (Panel B) months.  Others 
is a control portfolio of firms that did not conduct any acquisitions during the same period; an A-O 
is a zero-investment portfolio which goes long (short) Acquirers (Others). R is a mean monthly excess 
return; Vol is a standard deviation of monthly returns, α is an intercept from the five-factor model of 
Fama and French (2015), MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are respective factor exposures, and R2 is 
a coefficient of determination. R, Vol, and α are expressed in percentage terms. The numbers in brackets 
are bootstrap (for R) and Newey-West (1987) adjusted (for regression coefficients) t-statistics. Asterisks 
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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significantly positive, but this may be due to diversification return (see Willenbrock (2011)) 
on a portfolio of volatile stocks from multiple low-correlated markets. Neither in the value-
weighted portfolios or the long-short portfolios that go long (short), did the acquirers (other 
companies) exhibit any abnormal performance.
Noticeably, the performance of M&A-based portfolios displays no clear exposure to the 
FF5 model’s factors, including the investment factor CMA. The only exception is the size 
factor SMB—apparently, the acquirers are usually larger than the average company in the 
market.
One potential reason we do not see the post-merger long-term underperformance in 
frontier markets may be related to the nature of this kind of less developed segment of the 
capital market. We may assume that frontier markets are typically less liquid, less efficient, 
and have worse corporate governance (higher agency costs) than mature markets. Acquirers 
active in frontier markets are more likely to find a target for a takeover at a bargain price. It is 
also easier to enable true synergies after a takeover, especially if the target was a smaller, mis-
managed firm. Hence, biases related to hubris, overconfidence, and other aspects of manage-
rial irrationality on the side of the acquirers are more easily offset by opportunistically priced 
targets. In mature markets, on the other hand, it is more difficult to find attractively priced 
targets or to free up simple synergies. In such cases, managerial biases among acquirers are 
more likely to negatively affect long-term post-merger performance.
The theory of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) predicts that the underperformance of acquirers 
should be particularly pronounced following transactions paid in stocks. Indeed, evidence in 
support of this implication is provided by Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009), Savor and Lu 
(2009), Lau and Proimos (2010), and Lin, Chou, and Cheng (2011), and this is also consistent 
with the visual pattern in Figure 1 of this paper. Thus, we also replicate our tests within the 
subsamples of deals paid for with cash only and those paid for with stocks only. The results 
are reported in Table 2.
Table 2. Monthly returns on calendar-time portfolios of acquirers following deals paid for with cash 
and stocks
 



















EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW
R –0.31 –0.17 –0.33 –0.22 –0.20 –0.02 –0.34 –0.12 –0.29 –0.06 –0.28 –0.24
(–1.10) (–0.48) (–1.19) (–0.62) (–0.70) (–0.04) (–0.94) (–0.39) (–0.84) (–0.21) (–0.84) (–0.63)
α –0.20 –0.08 –0.19 –0.10 –0.03 0.15 –0.33 –0.05 –0.22 0.02 –0.18 –0.11
  (–0.74) (–0.26) (–0.76) (–0.33) (–0.12) (0.47)   (–0.89) (–0.15) (–0.62) (0.06) (–0.53) (–0.36)
Note.  The table reports mean monthly returns (R) and intercepts (α) from the five-factor model of 
Fama and French (2015) of zero-investment calendar-time portfolios formed of stocks of firms that 
conducted acquisitions paid for with cash (Panel A) and stocks (Panel B) during the previous 36, 48, 
and 60 months. The portfolios go long (short) acquirers (other companies). EW and VW indicate equal- 
and value-weighted portfolios. R and α are expressed in percentage terms. The numbers in brackets are 
bootstrap (for R) and Newey-West (1987) adjusted (for α) t-statistics.
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Again, no significant abnormal returns (raw or risk-adjusted) are observed in either the 
cash-paid or stock-paid cases. In other words, contrary to the apparent earlier theoretical 
and empirical evidence, the frontier market data confirm no notable underperformance of 
stock-paid deals. Again, this outcome also does not support the behavioral explanation of 
stock market acquisitions driven by relative mispricing between the acquirer and the target.
In addition to the reported tests, we conduct a few additional checks on the robustness 
of the time-series examinations. First, we split our main sample into cross sections based on 
three global regions: a) America, Asia, and the Pacific; b) Europe and Africa; and c) the Mid-
dle East. The regions are formed arbitrarily to provide a comparable number of firm-month 
observations within the subsamples. Subsequently, we conduct our standard time-series tests 
within the three geographical subsamples. We also supplement these examinations with a 
joint GRS test by Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) that verifies the hypothesis of whether 
all the intercepts from the five-factor model are equal to zero and equal to one other. The test 
is applied to a group of six portfolios, that is, the portfolios of acquirers and the portfolios 
of other stocks in each of the global regions. The six portfolios taken together form our full 
sample of frontier market companies.
Second, we divide the research period into two roughly equal subperiods: March 1997–
December 2006 and January 2007–September 2016. McLean and Pontiff (2016) document-
ed that the profitability of equity anomalies tends to decline with time. Thus, we checked 
whether, perhaps, the negative abnormal returns were present in the earlier years, but later 
vanished.
Third, we take an alternative reference point in time to form portfolios. Instead of the 
completion date, we follow Loughran and Vijh (1997), DeLong (2003), and Zaremba and 
Plotnicki (2016), inter alia, and use the acquisition announcement date.
Table 3 displays the results of the additional robustness checks. The outcomes do not 
alter our basic conclusion that the acquirers do not underperform in frontier markets. The 
regional subsamples (Panel A, Table 3) revealed no significant negative returns, with the 
exception of equal-weighted portfolios of Middle Eastern stocks. Nonetheless, even in this 
case, when the more realistic value-weighting approach is used, the significant underper-
formance disappears and the joint GRS tests no longer confirm any abnormal returns. Also, 
the subperiod analysis (Panel B, Table 3, 4) disclosed no time-series variation in returns. 
The mean returns and alphas were equally indistinguishable from zero, both in earlier and 
later years. Finally, substituting the completion dates with the announcement dates for port-
folio formation (Panel C, Table 3) did not lead to the appearance of any abnormal negative 
returns. Wrapping these observations up, the additional robustness checks do not support 
the mispricing theory of mergers; they document no robust abnormal returns on acquiring 
companies in frontier markets.
We performed also a few additional robustness checks. First, we additionally check the 
post-merger performance in the less and more efficient market segments. Second, we ex-
amine the influence of cross-sectionally varying limits on arbitrage and investor sentiment. 
These investigations reveal no qualitative differences in results. The detailed outcomes are 
reported in Appendices B and C to this article.
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Table 3. Additional robustness checks







EW VW   EW VW EW VW
America, Asia, and the Pacific
R 0.07 –0.21 0.14 –0.20 0.19 –0.09
(0.20) (–0.44) (0.38) (–0.34) (0.51) (–0.15)
α 0.24 –0.10 0.35 –0.10 0.38 0.05
(0.69) (–0.25) (0.98) (–0.22) (1.16) (0.12)
Europe and Africa
R 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.20 0.03
(0.61) (0.27) (0.62) (0.25) (0.69) (0.10)
α 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.17
(1.04) (0.97) (1.05) (0.88) (1.14) (0.76)
Middle East
R –0.58* –0.16 –0.63* –0.32 –0.46 –0.16
(–2.44) (–0.37) (–2.57) (–0.85) (–1.74) (–0.39)
α –0.52* –0.06 –0.58* –0.25 –0.38 –0.05
(–2.36) (–0.17) (–2.40) (–0.77) (–1.50) (–0.15)
Aggregate statistics
GRS 2.48* 0.58   3.27** 0.72   2.72* 0.55
p-value 0.0245 0.7484 0.0043 0.6355 0.0146 0.7672
Panel B. Performance within subperiods




EW VW EW VW EW VW
March 1997 – December 2006
R 0.04 0.46 –0.01 0.32 0.04 0.44
(0.13) (0.78) (0.03) (0.50) (0.13) (0.69)
α 0.02 0.47 –0.02 0.33 0.03 0.46
(0.05) (0.89) (–0.05) (0.57) (0.07) (0.78)
January 2007 – September 2016
R –0.08 –0.20   –0.05 –0.24   0.01 –0.24
(–0.36) (–1.07) (–0.22) (–1.21) (–0.02) (–1.22)
α –0.17 –0.11 –0.08 –0.17 –0.03 –0.21
  (–1.11) (–0.61) (–0.57) (–1.17) (–0.20) (–1.16)
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Panel C. Portfolios formed on announcement day
  36-month formation  period  
48-month formation 
period  
60-month formation  
period
EW VW EW VW EW VW
R –0.09 0.08   –0.11 –0.03   –0.07 0.03
(–0.35) (0.25) (–0.45) (–0.08) (–0.28) (0.10)
Int 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.19
  (0.17) (0.83) (0.16) (0.46) (0.38) (0.79)
Note. The table reports mean monthly returns (R) and intercepts (α) from the five-factor model of 
Fama and French (2015) of equal-weighed (EW) and value-weighted (VW) zero-investment calen-
dar-time portfolios formed of stocks of firms that conducted acquisitions during the previous 36, 48, 
and 60 months. The portfolios go long (short) acquirers (other companies). The numbers in brackets 
are bootstrap (for R) and Newey-West (1987) adjusted (for α) t-statistics. Asterisks * and ** indicate 
statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A displays the performance within 
various geographical subsamples; Panel B reports the performance within subperiods; Panel C presents 
the returns on calendar-time portfolios formed on announcement day rather than completion date.
Conclusions
The present study examined the long-run performance of acquirers following M&A deals. We 
analyzed almost 800 transactions within a sample of more than 3,600 stocks from 23 frontier 
markets for the years 1992–2016. 
The primary results of this study could be summarized as follows. We detect no signifi-
cant long-run abnormality in the returns of the acquirers, either when using cross-sectional 
or time-series tests. Furthermore, even though the theoretical basis implies that the effect 
should be more pronounced among the cash-paid transaction group and among the firms 
that are relatively small, illiquid, and characterized by considerable credit and idiosyncratic 
risk, additional robustness checks in the main manuscript and its appendices uncovered that 
this is not confirmed by the data; there are still no abnormal returns among these subgroups. 
Moreover, neither elevated investor sentiment nor excess market-wide limits on arbitrage 
are seen to strengthen the anomaly to a notable degree. Finally, the results are also robust 
to many considerations, including alternative reference points and formation periods, sub-
sample, and subperiod. To sum up, our outcomes do not support the behavioral explana-
tions of post-merger performance, including the hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
The long-term underperformance observed among acquirers is likely to be a result of data 
snooping and an example of a spurious return pattern.
The results are important from both academic and practitioner’s perspective. On the one 
hand, they provide new insights into asset pricing in international markets, casting doubt 
on the existence of abnormal post-merger returns. On the other hand, it has direct practi-
cal implications for money managers with local and international investment mandate: they 
should not be afraid of mergers because it is far from certain that they destroy value.
We are aware of some limitations of our research. Frontier markets are less recognized by 
investors, and we may not be aware of some special factors affecting our results. Our sample 
is also not homogeneous, and there might be local factors playing a role in some or all of 
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the individual markets. We based our study on data denominated in U.S. dollars, whereas 
returns expressed in local currencies might have given a different picture of the situation seen 
through the eyes of local investors rather than global players.
Further studies on the issues discussed in this paper could be pursued in two major direc-
tions. First, it would be interesting to dig further to find potential reasons for the acquirers’ 
different behavior in frontier markets as compared to mature ones. The possible explanations 
that we provided in this paper are only our speculative hypotheses that need to be examined 
further. Second, the identified lack of significant underperformance in frontier markets can 
be further investigated regarding potential differences in value creation in domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions.
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